Classically, two propositions are logically equivalent precisely when they are true under the same logical valuations. Also, two logical valuations are distinct if, and only if, there is a formula that is true according to one valuation, and false according to the other. By a real-valued logic we mean a many-valued logic in the sense of Petr Hájek that is complete with respect to a subalgebra of truth values of a BL-algebra given by a continuous triangular norm on [0, 1] . Abstracting the two foregoing properties from classical logic leads us to two principles that a real-valued logic may or may not satisfy. We prove that the two principles are sufficient to characterise Łukasiewicz and Gödel logic, to within extensions. We also prove that, under the additional assumption that the set of truth values be closed in the Euclidean topology of [0, 1], the two principles also afford a characterisation of Product logic.
Prologue.
At the outset of his landmark monograph [12] , Petr Hájek writes:
There are various systems of fuzzy logics, not just one. We have one basic logic (BL) and three of its most important extensions: Łukasiewicz logic, Gödel logic, and the product logic. [12, p.5] .
Basic Logic is, of course, the creation of Hájek himself. One of its several virtues is to afford metamathematical comparison of many-valued logics to an unprecedented degree of clarity. Our paper is intended as a modest contribution to such comparative studies; it will soon transpire that it would have been impossible to write it, in the possible but unfortunate worlds orphan of [12] .
We assume familiarity with Basic (propositional) Logic, triangular norms (t-norms, for short), and BLalgebras; see [12] , and Section 2 for an outline. Note that in this paper 't-norm' means 'continuous t-norm', for the sake of brevity. We write Form for the set of formulae over the countable collection of propositional variables Var := {X 1 , X 2 , . . .}, with primitive connectives → (implication), & (monoidal conjunction), and ⊥ (falsum). As usual, & is semantically interpreted by a t-norm, → by its residuum, and ⊥ by 0. We adopt the standard abbreviations, ¬α := α → ⊥, α ∧ β := α&(α → β), α ∨ β := ((α → β) → β) ∧ ((β → α) → α), and α ↔ β := (α → β)&(β → α). We write BL to denote Basic Logic, as axiomatised in [5, 12] . An extension of BL is a collection of formulae closed under the (syntactic) consequence relation of BL, and closed under substitutions. If M is an extension of BL, we always tacitly assume that M is consistent, we refer to M as a many-valued logic, and we denote by ⊢ M its consequence relation.
Łukasiewicz logic, denoted L, is obtained by extending BL with the axiom schema ¬¬ϕ → ϕ. Gödel logic, denoted G, is obtained by adding to BL the schema ϕ → (ϕ&ϕ). To obtain Product logic, written P, one extends BL with ¬ϕ ∨ ((ϕ → (ϕ&ψ)) → ψ). See [12, p.63 We say that the pair (L , T * ) is a real-valued logic if L is an extension of BL that is complete with respect to valuations µ : Form → T * into the given algebra of truth values. Any algebra of truth values T ′ * such that (L , T ′ * ) is a real-valued logic is said to induce L . When T * = [0, 1], we also say that L is induced by the t-norm * . (This makes sense, recalling that → * is uniquely determined by * . See Section 2 below.) Distinct algebras of truth values may of course induce the same logic L , i.e. the same extension of BL. When we write that L is a real-valued logic, with no reference to T * , we mean that there is at least one algebra of truth values T * that induces L .
With this machinery in place, we consider two principles that a real-valued logic L may or may not satisfy.
P1. For every algebra T * of truth values inducing L , the following holds. For each α, β ∈ Form, we have ⊢ L α ↔ β if, and only if,
P2. For every algebra T * of truth values inducing L , the following holds. For each pair of valuations µ, ν : Form → T * , if µ = ν then there is a formula α ∈ Form such that µ(α) > 0 while ν(α) = 0.
Our first two results are that P1 and P2 are characteristic of G and L, respectively, to within extensions.
Theorem I. A real-valued logic (L , T * ) satisfies P1 if, and only if, L is an extension of Gödel logic.
Theorem II. A real-valued logic (L , T * ) satisfies P2 if, and only if, L is an extension of Łukasiewicz logic. Remark 1.1. Observe that the two preceding theorems show that in P1 and P2 one can safely replace the initial universal quantification by an existential one. In other words, the principles P1 and P2 display robustness with respect to the specific choice of the algebra of truth values, salva logica L .
We prove Theorem I in Section 3, and Theorem II in Section 4, after some preliminaries in Section 2.
The question arises, can one also characterise Product logic by means of general principles such as P1 and P2. We shall show how to answer this question affirmatively, under one additional assumption. Let us say that the real-valued logic L is closed if there exists an algebra of truth values T * inducing L such that the underlying set of T * is closed in the Euclidean topology of [0, 1]. Product logic is the unique closed real-valued logic that fails both P1 and P2 hereditarily with respect to real-valued extensions, in the following sense:
Theorem III. A closed real-valued logic L is Product logic if, and only if, L and all of its non-classical, real-valued extensions fail P1 and P2.
We prove Theorem III in Section 5.
2
The proofs of Theorems I-III are relatively straightforward applications of known facts about extensions of Basic Logic. The interest of the present contribution, if any, is thus to be sought not so much in the technical depth of the results, as in the significance of the two principles P1 and P2 in connection with logics of comparative truth. Before turning to the proofs, let us therefore expound on P1 and P2 a little.
Logics fulfilling P1 share with classical logic the feature that each proposition is uniquely determined, up to logical equivalence, by the collection of its true interpretations (that is, models), where 'true' in the latter sentence is to be read as 'true to degree 1'. In the classical case this may be conceived as a consequence of the Principle of Bivalence, along with completeness. (Indeed, if in classical logic α and β evaluate to 1 at exactly the same µ's, then, by bivalence, they evaluate to the same value at each µ; hence α ↔ β is a tautology, and we therefore have ⊢ α ↔ β by completeness.) Theorem I shows that, remarkably, real-valued logics that fail the Principle of Bivalence-for instance, Gödel logic-may still satisfy P1.
Logics fulfilling P2 share with classical logic the feature that distinct models of the logic can be separated by some formula. In more detail, classical logic has the property that if µ and ν are two distinct true interpretations of its axioms, then there is a formula α that can tell apart the two models µ and ν, in the sense that α is not false (i.e. true) in µ but false in ν. A logic failing P2, by contrast, must allow two distinct true interpretations µ and ν of its axioms which are indiscernible, in the sense that no proposition is false (i.e. evaluates to degree 0) in ν and not false (i.e. evaluates to degree > 0) in µ.
1 In this precise sense, the given real-valued semantics of such a logic is redundant, as one could identify µ and ν without any logical loss. Theorem II shows that, remarkably, there is just one [0, 1]-valued logic-namely, Łukasiewicz logic-capable of avoiding that redundancy, by actually telling apart any two distinct real numbers in [0, 1].
Preliminary facts about real-valued logics.
We outline the framework of Hájek's Basic Logic. A (continuous) t-norm is a binary operation * : [12] , of course, that this set is recursively axiomatisable by schemata, using modus ponens as the only deduction rule; see also [5] for an improved axiomatisation. Moreover, BL is an algebraizable logic, see [12, p.25 and references therein]; the algebras in the corresponding variety are called BL-algebras, and schematic extensions of BL are in one-one natural correspondence with subvarieties of BL-algebras. Each t-norm * :
, and the variety of BL-algebras is generated by the collection of all t-norms. More generally, each algebra of truth values as defined above is a BL-algebra. We occasionally write 'BL-chain' for 'totally ordered BL-algebra'.
Given algebras of truth-values T * , T
Recall the three fundamental t-norms.
x ⊙ y := max{0, x + y − 1} (1)
x × y := xy
The associated residua evaluate to 1 for each x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x y; when x > y, they are respectively given by:
The algebra of truth values
is called the standard MV-algebra; the standard Gödel algebra, denoted T min , and the standard Product algebra, denoted T × , are defined analogously using (2-3) and their residua. The important completeness theorems for L, G, and P will be tacitly assumed throughout: they state that these logics are complete with respect to evaluations into T ⊙ , T min , and T × , respectively. For proofs and references, consult [12, Theorems 3.2.13, 4.2.17, and 4.1.13, and passim].
In the remainder of this section we collect technical results needed in the sequel. We begin with a remark that will find frequent application.
Remark 2.1. For any real-valued logic (L , T * ), let T ′ * be an algebra of truth values that is isomorphic to T * . Then the logic induced by T ′ * is again L . This follows immediately from the fact that σ(1) = 1 and
The converse statement is false in general: it is well known that non-isomorphic t-norms may induce the same real-valued logic. However, the following hold.
1. The only t-norm inducing G is the minimum operator, for it is the only idempotent t-norm. See [12, Theorem 2.1.16]. Lemma 2.2. For any real-valued logic (L , T * ), and for any formulae α, β ∈ Form, we have:
Each t-norm inducing
by the completeness of L with respect to T * , for all valuations µ : Form → T * we have µ(α ↔ β) = 1 iff, since 1 is the neutral element for * ,
BL-algebras are defined over the signature ( * , →, ⊥). Basic hoops are the ⊥-free subreducts of BLalgebras, the latter considered over the extended signature that includes ⊤ := ⊥ → ⊥. Conversely, BLalgebras are bounded basic hoops, that is, basic hoops with a minimum element which interprets the new constant ⊥. Let now (I, ) be a totally ordered set, and let {C i } i∈I be a family of totally ordered basic hoops, where
Then the ordinal sum of the family {C i } i∈I is the structure
otherwise, and
Each C i is called a summand of the ordinal sum. Proof. This is essentially [14, Theorem B].
Lemma 2.4. Let A be a subalgebra of an ordinal sum i∈I B i . Then there exists J ⊆ I and algebras {C j | j ∈ J} such that C j is a subalgebra of B j for each j ∈ J, and A ∼ = j∈J C j .
Proof. Direct inspection of the definition of ordinal sum. [4] are (term equivalent to) BL-algebras satisfying the equation ¬¬x = x, where ¬x is short for x → ⊥. Wajsberg hoops are the ⊥-free subreducts of MV-algebras; equivalently, MV-algebras are exactly the bounded Wajsberg hoops.
MV-algebras
Lemma 2.5. Each finite BL-chain splits into an ordinal sum of finitely many finite MV-chains.
Proof. This is [1, Theorem 3.7] , together with the observation that finite Wajsberg hoops are necessarily bounded.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose the algebra of truth values T * is not a subalgebra of T ⊙ . Then T * splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two summands.
Proof. If T * is finite, from Lemma 2.5 it follows that T * is isomorphic to an ordinal sum of finitely many finite MV-chains. Since, by assumption, T * is not a subalgebra of T ⊙ , the ordinal sum must contain at least two summands.
If T * is an infinite subalgebra of [0, 1], by Lemmata 2.3 and 2.4 it follows that T * is isomorphic to an ordinal sum i∈I C i where each summand C i is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T ⊙ , T min , or T × . If the index set I has at least two elements, we are done; otherwise, by the hypotheses T * is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T min or of T × , and it has more than two elements. Now, by direct inspection, T min is isomorphic to r∈[0,1) {0, 1}, while T × is isomorphic to {0, 1} ⊕ C, where C = ( (0, 1], ×, → × , 1 ) is known as the standard cancellative hoop. Any subalgebra of T min with more than two elements is then a non-trivial ordinal sum of copies of {0, 1}, while any subalgebra of T × distinct from {0, 1} is of the form {0, 1} ⊕ C ′ , for C ′ a subhoop of C. In both cases, T * splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two summands.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose the algebra of truth values T * splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two summands, say i∈I C i , where each C i is a totally ordered basic hoop, and |I| 2. Then I has a least element, say i 0 . Further, let S ⊆ T * be the support of a summand distinct from C i0 . For any two valuations µ, ν : Form → T * such that µ(Var), ν(Var) ⊆ S, and for any α ∈ Form, we have:
Proof. Since T * is bounded below, the existence of i 0 follows from inspection of the definition of ordinal sum. We first prove the following claim by induction on the structure of formulae: For any valuation µ : Form → T * such that µ(Var) ⊆ S, and for any α ∈ Form, we have µ(α) ∈ S ∪ {0}.
If α is either ⊥ or α ∈ Var, the claim holds trivially. Suppose α = β&γ. By the induction hypothesis, µ(β), µ(γ) ∈ S ∪ {0}. If both µ(β), µ(γ) ∈ S then, by the definition of ordinal sum, µ(β&γ) ∈ S, too. If at least one among β and γ, say β, is such that µ(β) = 0, then µ(β&γ) = 0. Hence µ(β&γ) ∈ S ∪ {0} 5
for all µ such that µ(Var) ⊆ S.
, by the definition of ordinal sum, µ(β → γ) ∈ S, too. Finally, if µ(β) ∈ S and µ(γ) = 0, then µ(β → γ) = 0. In all cases µ(β → γ) ∈ S ∪ {0}. This settles the claim.
Consider now µ, ν : Form → T * such that µ(Var), ν(Var) ⊆ S, and any formula α ∈ Form. It suffices to show that µ(α) = 0 implies ν(α) = 0. By the preceding claim, we have µ(α), ν(α) ∈ S ∪ {0}. We proceed again by induction on the structure of formulae. The base cases α = ⊥ or α ∈ Var hold trivially. Let α = β&γ. The definition of ordinal sum entails that µ(β&γ) = 0 can only occur if at least one of µ(β) and µ(γ), say µ(β), lies in the first summand C i0 . By the preceding claim, µ(β) = 0. By induction ν(β) = 0, and therefore ν(β&γ) = 0. Let α = β → γ. Assume µ(β → γ) = 0. The definition of ordinal sum entails either µ(β) > µ(γ) = 0, or both µ(β), µ(γ) ∈ C i0 . In the latter case, the preceding claim shows µ(β) = µ(γ) = 0, and therefore µ(β → γ) = 1, which is a contradiction. In the former case, by induction ν(β) > ν(γ) = 0. By the preceding claim, ν(β) ∈ S. By the definition of ordinal sum ν(β → γ) = 0. This completes the proof.
Logics satisfying P1.
Lemma 3.1. For any real-valued logic (L , T * ), we have:
Moreover, we have: any two finite subalgebras of T min of the same cardinality are isomorphic, and from the axiomatisation of the subvariety of Gödel algebras generated by the n-element chain, essentially given in [11] .
Lemma 3.2. Any real-valued logic that satisfies P1 is an extension of G.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive: a real-valued logic L that does not extend G fails P1. Indeed, by the hypothesis we have ⊢ L X 1 ↔ X 1 &X 1 . On the other hand, for any algebra of truth values T * inducing L , and for any valuation µ : Form → T * , we have
Indeed, (4) holds by the very definition of t-norm, which includes the condition 1 * 1 = 1; and (5) holds by the fact that t-norms are non-increasing in both arguments, whence µ(X 1 &X 1 ) µ(X 1 ). Now (4) (5) show that L fails P1 for α = X 1 and β = X 1 &X 1 .
For the proof of the next lemma we recall the notion of semantic consequence with respect to an algebra of truth values T * . Given a set Γ ⊆ Form and α ∈ Form, we say that α is a semantic consequence of Γ with respect to T * , in symbols Γ T * α if, for any valuation µ : Var → T * , the fact that µ(γ) = 1 for each γ ∈ Γ implies µ(α) = 1. Lemma 3.3. Any real-valued logic L that is an extension of G satisfies P1.
Proof. Let T * be an algebra of truth values inducing L . By Lemma 3.1 we know that T * is a subalgebra of T min . Let α, β ∈ Form be such that µ(α) = 1 iff µ(β) = 1, for each valuation µ : Form → T * . By the definition of semantic consequence, we have α T * β and β T * α. Recall that G is strongly complete with respect to T min ([12, Theorem 4.2.17. (2)]). By Lemma 3.1, each real-valued extension L of G distinct from G is induced by a finite subalgebra of T min , and it is moreover strongly complete with respect to any such (essentially unique) subalgebra ([6, Proposition 4.18 and Corollary 4.19]). In all cases we therefore infer α ⊢ L β and β ⊢ L α. The logic G has the Deduction Theorem by [12, Theorem 4.2.10. (1)], and the same proof shows that each extension of G also has the Deduction Theorem. We thereby obtain ⊢ L β → α and ⊢ L α → β. Hence, by Lemma 2.2, we conclude ⊢ L α ↔ β, as was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem I. Combine Lemmata 3.2 and 3.3.
Remark 3.4. Theorem I holds even if we relax the notion of real-valued logic considerably. Recall that MTL (monoidal t-norm-based logic) is the logic of all left-continuous t-norms and their residua [10] ; write Form ′ for the set of well-formed formulae of MTL. (In contrast to BL, here it is necessary to regard the lattice-theoretic conjunction ∧ as primitive.) The algebraic semantics corresponding to MTL is provided by MTL-algebras. By a standard MTL-algebra we mean an MTL-algebra induced by a left-continuous t-norm on [0, 1] and its residuum. Now replace the definition of real-valued logic by the following. The pair (L , T * ) is a real-valued logic if L is an extension of MTL that is complete with respect to valuations µ : Form ′ → T * into an arbitrary MTL-subalgebra T * of some standard MTL-algebra. It is well known that Remark 2.1.1 holds even if we consider all left-continuous t-norms instead of the continuous ones only. And it is possible to show that Lemmata 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 continue to hold. Hence Theorem I holds for real-valued logics in the present sense.
Logics satisfying P2.
Lemma 4.1. For any real-valued logic (L , T * ), we have:
Moreover, we have:
2) µ(X 1 ) = ¬¬µ(X 1 ) for any valuation µ : Var → T * iff a = ¬¬a for any a ∈ T * iff (by Remark 2.1.2) T * is an MV-algebra with some underlying set U ⊆ [0, 1]. Now, if U is finite, say of cardinality n, then T * is isomorphic to the MV-chain [4, Proposition 3.6.5] , and direct inspection shows that T n−1 is a subalgebra of T ⊙ . Assume then that U is infinite. Observe that T * cannot be a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two summands: consider such a sum B ⊕ C, and take 1 = c ∈ C. Then ¬¬c = 1 = c, and hence B ⊕ C is not an MV-algebra. By Lemma 2.6 and by Remark 2.1.2, T * is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T ⊙ . Clearly, if T * is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T ⊙ then L extends L. This proves the first statement. Each finite MV-chain generates a proper subvariety of the variety of MV-algebras (see [ Proof. By contraposition, suppose L is not an extension of L. If T * is an algebra of truth values that induces L , then T * is not a subalgebra of T ⊙ : for, given that T ⊙ does induce L (cf. Remark 2.1), any such subalgebra clearly induces an extension of L. Hence, by Lemma 2.6, T * splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two summands. With the notation therein, there exists a summand S of T * distinct from the first one that is non-trivial, and thus contains two distinct elements v = w. Let µ v be the unique valuation that sends each variable to v, and let ν w be the unique valuation that sends each variable to w. Evidently, we have µ v = ν w , so that µ v and ν w fail P2 by Lemma 2.7. 7
Remark 4.3. Let (L , T * ) be a real-valued logic. In the next lemma we say, somewhat informally, that "L satisfies P2 with respect to T * ", to mean that for any two valuations µ = ν : Form → T * there is α ∈ Form with µ(α) > 0 and ν(α) = 0. 
It is not the case that σ
for else µ = ν would follow by pre-composing with σ. Now for any α ∈ Form we have:
(by assumption),
Hence L fails P2 with respect to T * , as was to be shown. Proof. In light of Remark 2.1.2 and Lemma 4.4, it suffices to show that L satisfies P2 with respect to the Łukasiewicz t-norm ⊙ on [0, 1]. For terms s and t over the binary monoidal operation ⊙ and the unary operation ¬, set s ⊕ t := ¬(¬s ⊙ ¬t). Let us write nt as a shorthand for t ⊕ · · · ⊕ t (n − 1 occurrences of ⊕), and t n as a shorthand for t ⊙ · · · ⊙ t (n − 1 occurrences of ⊙). We inductively define the set of basic literals (in the variables X i , i = 1, 2, . . .) as follows.
• X i is a basic literal;
• each term s either of the form s = nt or of the form s = t n , for some integer n > 0, is a basic literal, provided that t is a basic literal;
• nothing else is a basic literal.
Given integers n 1 1, and n 2 , . . . , n u > 1, we write (n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n u )X i to denote the basic literal
In this proof, a term function is any function λ τ : [0, 1] n → [0, 1] induced by interpreting over the standard MV-algebra T ⊙ = ([0, 1], ⊙, ¬, 0) a term τ whose variables are contained in {X 1 , . . . , X n }. Below we also use the interpretation of the definable lattice connective ∧ as the minimum operator. ] n → [0, 1] takes value 0 at q, and value > 0 at p.
Proof. Since p = q there exists an integer i 1 such that p(i) = q(i), that is, p and q differ at one of their coordinates. If q(i) < p(i) then there are integers h, k > 0 such that q(i) < 1, then one can choose j such that p(j) < q(j). As before there are integers h, k > 0 such that p(j) < h k < q(j), with h and k coprime, and there is a basic literal R = (b 1 , . . . , b w )X i such that λ
n−1 , and λ R is monotone increasing in the variable X i . Hence λ ¬R (p) > 0 and λ ¬R (q) = 0.
The proof is now completed by a routine translation of Claim 4.7 from terms to formulae of L. To conclude this section, let us discuss two alternative formulations of P2. We consider the following conditions, for every algebra T * of truth values inducing L .
P2
′ . For each pair of valuations µ, ν : Form → T * , if µ = ν then there is a formula α ∈ Form such that µ(α) < 1 while ν(α) = 1.
′′ . For each pair of valuations µ, ν : Form → T * , if µ = ν then there is a formula α ∈ Form such that µ(α) = 0 while ν(α) = 1. Proof. Let T * be an algebra of truth-values inducing the real-valued logic L . It suffices to prove that if L is an extension of L then it satisfies P2 ′ and P2 ′′ , and otherwise it fails both. Assume first that L is an extension of L. Given valuations µ = ν with values in T * , by Theorem II there is a formula α be such that µ(α) > 0 and ν(α) = 0. Then µ(¬α) < 1 and ν(¬α) = 1. Hence P2 ′ holds. We now show that P2
′ implies P2 ′′ . In light of Remark 2.1.2 and Lemma 4.4, we may safely assume that T * is a subalgebra of T ⊙ . Then, if µ(α) < 1 and ν(α) = 1, it is clear by the definition of ⊙ that there exists an integer k 1 such that µ(α k ) = 0 and ν(α k ) = 1, where α 1 = α and α n = α ⊙ α n−1 . Assume now T * does not induce an extension of L. By Theorem II, there are distinct valuations µ and ν such that ν(α) = 0 implies µ(α) = 0 for any formula α. This suffices to show that P2 ′′ fails. For what concerns P2
′ , recall that, by Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 2.6, T * splits into a non-trivial ordinal sum of at least two summands. Let µ be the valuation assigning 1 to every variable. Then it is easy to check that µ(α) ∈ {0, 1} for each formula α. Let ν be a valuation such that ν(Var) is contained in a summand of T * distinct from the first one. Then, by Lemma 2.7, for each formula α we have ν(α) = 0 iff µ(α) = 0, and hence ν(α) = 1 implies µ(α) = 1, that is, P2
′ fails.
5. Product logic.
Lemma 5.1. The only many-valued logic that extends P properly is classical logic.
Proof. This is essentially [3, Corollary 2.10].
Lemma 5.2. Product logic P fails both P1 and P2.
Proof. (P1) Choose the standard product algebra T × to induce P. It follows directly from the definition of t-norm that µ(X 1 ) = 1 if, and only if, µ(X 1 &X 1 ) = 1, for any valuation µ : Form → T × . To see that P1 fails, it thus suffices to observe that ⊢ P X 1 ↔ X 1 &X 1 : for else, by soundness and Lemma 2.2, we would have µ(X 1 &X 1 ) = µ(X 1 )µ(X 1 ) = µ(X 1 ) whatever µ is; this is a contradiction. Proof. We know that L is not an extension of G or L, by Theorems I and II. Let T * be any algebra of truth values inducing L . We will show that T * cannnot be finite, to begin with. If T * is finite, by Lemma 2.5 we know that T * splits into an ordinal sum of finitely many finite MV-chains. If there is just one summand, then L is an extension of L, and this is a contradiction. If there is more than one summand then, by the definition of ordinal sum, and using the fact that each summand is bounded below by 0, there is an idempotent element 0, 1 = e ∈ T * . The subset G 3 := {0, e, 1} ⊆ T * is closed under the BL-algebraic operations, as is checked easily, and all of its elements are idempotent. Hence G 3 is isomorphic to the three-element Gödel algebra. Now consider the collection E of formulae that evaluate to 1 under each valuation into G 3 . Obviously E ⊇ L , and E is closed under substitutions by its very definition. Hence E is a real-valued extension of L which by construction is three-valued Gödel logic. Theorem I implies that E satisfies P1, and we have reached a contradiction.
We may therefore suppose that T * has an infinite closed subset of [0, 1] as its support. By definition, T * extends to a BL-algebra ([0, 1], * ′ , → * ′ , 0). By Lemmata 2.3 and 2.4, T * decomposes into an ordinal sum i∈I C i , where each summand C i is isomorphic to a subalgebra of one amongst T ⊙ , T min , and T × . If the index set I has more than one element, then using again the fact that each summand C i is bounded below by 0, we have an idempotent element 0, 1 = e ∈ T * , and hence {0, e, 1} is a three-element Gödel subalgebra of T * . We then reason as above to conclude that L has three-valued Gödel logic as an extension, reaching a contradiction. Hence I is a singleton, that is, T * is isomorphic to a subalgebra of T ⊙ , T min , and T × . Using Remark 2.1, and Theorems I and II, T * cannot be isomorphic to a subalgebra of T ⊙ -because it fails P2 -nor can it be isomorphic to a subalgebra of T min -because it fails P1. Then T * is isomorphic to an infinite subalgebra of T × , and hence L = P, by [3, Corollary 2.9].
Proof of Theorem III. Lemmata 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
Remark 5.4. Theorem III fails if we drop the assumption that L be closed. Indeed, consider the logic L induced by {0, 1} ⊕ C ⊕ C, where C is the standard cancellative hoop (see the proof of Lemma 2.6). Then it can be verified that L is not closed, that L is not P, and that all of its non-classical, real-valued extensions fail P1 and P2.
Epilogue.
Let us return to Hájek's Programme, as embodied in [12] . According to Hájek, a real-valued logic may be considered as a "logic of imprecise (vague) propositions" [12, p.vii] , wherein "truth [. . . ] is a matter of degree" [12, p.2] . Classical logic may be viewed as a limiting case, where only two degrees of truth, 0 and 1, exist. But as soon as a logic is genuinely real-valued, it must renounce at least one of the familiar features P1 and P2 of the classical world. We record this fact as a formal statement, by way of conclusion.
Corollary. A real-valued logic L satisfies P1 and P2 if, and only if, L is classical logic if, and only if, T * = {0, 1} is the unique algebra of truth values that induces L .
Proof. That L is classical logic just in case L satisfies P1 and P2 follows from Theorems I-II upon observing that the only common extension of G and L is classical logic, by [12, Theorem 4.3.9 . (1)]. It thus remains to show that L is classical logic if, and only if, T * = {0, 1} as soon as T * induces L . By the very definition of t-norm, T * = {0, 1} induces classical logic. On the other hand, if there exists a ∈ T * \ {0, 1} then max {a, a → * 0} < 1. Indeed, a → * 0 = 1 would entail a * 1 = 0 for a > 0, which is impossible. Any valuation µ : Form → T * that sends X 1 to a is therefore such that µ(X 1 ∨ ¬X 1 ) < 1, and the logic induced by T * cannot be classical.
